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Past decades have witnessed growing empirical evidence that calls into
question the utility maximization paradigm. For a description of systematic
errors made by experimental subjects, see Arkes and Hammond (1986), Hog-
arth (1980), Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982), and Nisbett and Ross
(1980), and the survey papers by Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1982), and
by Pitz and Sachs (1984).
An important question is whether the observed deviations from rational-
ity are important for economic behavior. To argue for the importance of
these deviations, one should either provide applicable examples where these
deviations are observed in economic environments, or provide theoretical ex-
amples where a small amount of non-maximizing behavior may have large
eﬀects on the equilibrium.
On the empirical side, there is a large body of evidence cited in Kagel and
Roth￿s (1995) review of existing empirical studies of auctions. They describe
systematic deviations from the predictions of the standard theory. Since
auctions represent one of the most important forms of market organization
(as may be evident, for example, from their role in facilitating the priva-
tization process in the democracies of Eastern Europe and also in Western
1countries), this provides one example of an economically signi￿cant violation
of the rationality paradigm.
There also exists a large body of theoretical literature that can be brought
to bear upon the importance of deviations from full rationality. For exam-
ple, Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) developed an evolutionary model of
coordination, in which a small mutation rate may prevent the system from
getting stuck at an equilibrium which is risk dominated. Similar results were
obtained by Fudenberg and Harris (1992), Young (1993). Selten (1975) ar-
gued that a small amount of noise can be used to rule out certain Nash equi-
libria. In a general equilibrium context, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) showed
that small deviations from rationality may have a signi￿cant impact upon
equilibrium outcomes and the welfare of agents.
For a comprehensive review of the importance of bounded rationality in
economic models, see Conlisk (1996). This paper also contains an extensive
literature survey. Learning is an important component of boundedly rational
behavior. There exists an extensive body of psychological learning literature.
See, for example, Estes (1950), Bush and Mosteller (1955). These models
were introduced into economics by Luce (1959). In his model, the probability





where the function V : M → R is called a scaling function. Consider the
function U =l nV . In terms of the function U, the probability distribution
above is the logistic one; and the function U can be interpreted as a utility
function.
Since importance of learning is also well understood in economic litera-
ture, it may therefore be interesting to put together ideas of learning and
randomness. Such an attempt was made by Anderson, Goeree and Holt
(1997). They presented a dynamic model in which agents adjust their deci-
sions in the direction of higher payoﬀs, subject to random error. This process
produces a probability distribution over players, decisions whose time evolu-
tion follows the Fokker-Planck equation. The authors found a steady state
of the process and proved that it is globally stable. However, they derived
their equations only for one-dimensional case and concentrate on i.i.d. errors.
I will provide generalization of their models for multidimensional case and
discuss qualitatively what would change if errors are autocorrelated.
The model provides both justi￿cations and limitations for the use of the
3logit model, popular in the empirical Industrial Organization literature. More
precisely, one can obtain restrictions on the covariance matrix of mistakes
that are consistent with a logit distribution being a steady state of the model.
The logit model has some well-recognized diﬃculties (Luce 1959). Con-
sider, for example, a situation when an individual has to choose between
driving to work or taking a bus. Suppose she slightly prefers to take a bus.
Then the logit model will suggest that the probability of driving is slightly
below 1/2. Now suppose, that instead of choosing between driving and tak-
ing a bus, the individual has to choose between driving, choosing a red bus,
and choosing a blue bus. Assume she has no preference for color. Then, intu-
itively, one might expect that the probability she decides to drive will remain
the same. However, the logit model predicts that now all the probabilities
will be close to 1/3.
Putting the logit model into a learning context allows to shed some light
on the ￿bus paradox.￿ Indeed, as it will be shown below, the logit model
arises as a steady state of a learning rule when mistakes of a given size in
each direction are equally likely. In the context of previous example, if the
individual intends to take a red bus, she should be equally likely to take a
blue bus or to drive instead. This behavior does not seem plausible, hence,
4it is not surprising that the steady state resulting from it possesses some
counterintuitive properties.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 introduces a model
of noisy individual adjustment. Section 3 studies the evolution of the pop-
ulation density. Section 4 discusses experimental data on learning of Merlo
and Schotter (1999) in the context of my model. Section 5 concludes.
2A M O D E L
Assume an individual repeatedly faces with a problem of choosing an al-
ternative from a one-connected, compact set Ω ⊂ Rn . Consider a population
consisting of a continuum of identical agents. Assume that the choices made
by each agent follow the stochastic process:
dx = ∇Π(x)dt + Λ(x,t)dW, (1)
when x is an interior point of Ω.I fx ∈ Bd(Ω) the agent follows rule (3.1)
whenever possible, and stays put otherwise. The ￿rst term in (1) corre-
sponds to a gradient dynamics and says that agents adjust their choices in
the direction of the maximal increase of payoﬀs. The second term states
5that these choices are subject to random error. Functions Π and Λ are as-
sumed to be twice continuously diﬀerentiable in the interior of the set Ω and
continuously diﬀerentiable on the boundary. The vector dW is a vector of in-
dependent, standard Weiner processes. This assumption implies that errors
are uncorrelated in time, though correlation among diﬀerent components of
x is permitted and is given by the matrix Γ(x,t)=ΛT(x,t)Λ(x,t).D e p e n -
dence of Λ on x allows, for instance, the individual to think harder to reduce
an error if the losses associated with it are bigger, while dependence of Λ on
time allows the variance to change due, for instance, to learning.
This model is a particular case of the general model introduced in the
previous chapter. The general model is reduced to it when information about
the behavior of others is not available or is ignored. The simulated annealing
procedure, frequently used in numerical analysis, can be considered as a
particular case of the dynamics speci￿ed above. In simulating annealing
algorithms, the system, with some probability moves in the direction of the
gradient, and with some probability makes a choice at random from some
distribution. The variance of this distribution decreases in time according
to the exogenously speci￿ed, so-called annealing, schedule. As time goes
to in￿nity, variance goes to zero. For a detailed discussion of the method
6of simulated annealing, see Laarhoven (1988). In a behavioral context, the
random choice in the simulated annealing procedure can be interpreted as
experimentation, and the decrease in variance as the result of learning.
3 EVOLUTION OF THE POPULATION DEN-
SITY OF BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL AGENTS
In this section I will consider a population consisting of individuals who
follow the adaptation rule (1). I assume that the set of admissible alternatives
Ω is compact, one-connected, and has a smooth boundary. Let f(x,t) be the
density of the population that chooses x at time t and assume that the initial
choices x0 are distributed according to the function g(x).













< Γ(x,t)∇f,n(x) >=0 (3)
and the initial condition f(x,0) = g(x), where the vector n(x) is the unit
vector normal to the boundary of the set Ω at each point x of the boundary.
3.1 A ONE-DIMENSIONAL CASE
Consider a particular case of the model when the choice space is a segment
[a1,a 2] o ft h er e a ll i n ea n dΓ(x,t)=σ2 is constant. This is the case originally
considered by Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1997). The unique stationary










This distribution is known as the logit distribution. Note that this is the
same type of distribution as obtained by Luce (1959) from the axiomatic ap-
proach. It possesses an interesting property called Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA).
De￿nition 1 Ap o p u l a t i o nd e n s i t yf(x) satis￿es IIA if for any x1, x2 ∈ Ω,
8the ratio f(x1)/f(x2) does not depend on Ω.
The IIA property applied to stationary choice densities says that the ratio
of the probability that the choice is in an ε− ball centered at the point x1
to the probability that it is in an ε− ball centered at point x2 does not
depend on whether some other choice z is available, up to the order o(ε).F o r
the density function (3.4), the ratio f(x1)/f(x2) depends only on the payoﬀ
diﬀerence at points x1 and x2 and, hence, satis￿es IIA.
Before going further it is interesting to discuss the eﬀect of the autocorre-
lated. experimentation on the equation governing the time evolution of the
density function. Assume that the adaptation rule for the variable x is given
by:
dx = Π
0(x)dt + dz (5)
where dz follows the stochastic diﬀerential equation:
dz = −αzdt+ σdW (6)
with z(0) = z0 . This is called the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
Theorem 2 If the adaptation rule for variable x is given by (3.5), F(x,t) is
9t h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tt h ec h o i c ev a r i a b l ei sl e s st h a nx at instant t,a n d f(x,t)




















for every t and k = 1,2, and
f(x,0) = g(x) (9)
For a proof see, for example, Bhattacharya and Waymire (1990). Let
us next require in addition that the error process be stationary. This is
equivalent to requiring α ≥ 0. To see this note that the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process is a continuous time version of a ￿rst order autoregressive process.
If one considers observations of z made at discrete instants k∆t,w h e r ek is
natural number and ∆t is suﬃciently small, then z will follow a discrete
time ￿rst order autoregressive process:
zt+1 = ρzt + εt (10)
10where ρ =e x p ( −α∆t) and εt is white noise. A ￿rst order autoregressive
p r o c e s si sk n o w nt ob es t a t i o n a r yi f|ρ| < 1,w h i c hj u s t i ￿es the above asser-
tion.
For the case of a stationary error process, equations (7) and (8) imply
that autocorrelation of errors will not have long run eﬀects. Nevertheless, its
short run eﬀect can be quite signi￿cant. For example, if z0 is such that the
diﬀusion term in (7) vanishes at t =0 ,t h e nf o rs m a l lt, the individual will
approximately follow the gradient dynamics, which would result in a rapid
decrease of variance and might create an illusion that the individuals learned
the rational choice. However, for larger t, one will observe a divergence of the
distribution from a nearly rational outcome towards a more dispersed logit
outcome. This might be interpreted as an exacerbation of errors by learn-
ing. A discussion of the possibility of this eﬀect, a description of alternative
explanations, and related literature can be found in Baumann et al. (1991).
3.2 A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CASE
Having discussed in detail the one-dimensional case, let us return to the
multidimensional setting, that is, assume that the choice space Ω is a com-
pact, one-connected subset of RL with smooth boundary, where L>1.
11Theorem 3 Assume that Γ(x,t) does not depend on t. Then a steady state
solution of problem (2)-(3) exists. It is unique and asymptotically stable.
For a proof, see Ito (1979). This result generalizes the analogous result for
the one-dimensional case obtained by Anderson et al. (1997). Nevertheless,
there is a profound diﬀerence between the one-dimensional and multidimen-
sional cases. In the one-dimensional case, the steady state satis￿es the IIA
property, which might be economically signi￿cant at least in some contexts.
It turns out that in the multidimensional case, this property is not satis￿ed
unless rather strong assumptions either on errors or on the payoﬀ structure
are imposed.





Let n(x) be a unit vector, normal to the boundary ∂Ω of the choice set. Then
in the steady state, j(x) should solve the following boundary problem
div(j(x)) = 0 (12)
hj(x),n(x)i =0 (13)
12for any x ∈ ∂Ω.






The IIA property implies that a change in Ω will result in multiplication of f,
and hence of j,b yac o n s t a n t ,t h a ti sjnew = Cjold
1. Hence jnew should solve
the same boundary problem, but on a diﬀerent domain. The only vector j
that would solve (3.12)-(3.13) for any domain is j =0 . Hence IIA together





Young￿s theorem implies that the necessary and suﬃcient condition for (3.15)



























1This relation should hold at each point which belongs to the intersection of the new
and the old choice space.
13If the errors are independent of x, then this condition implies either that er-
rors are spherical (Γ(x)=σ2I), or the payoﬀ function is additively separable
in diﬀerent components of the choice vector x and the matrix Γ is diagonal.
Hence, in the multidimensional case IIA holds only under strong conditions
on the errors or on the payoﬀ function.
Although very special, the assumption of spherical errors may still be
reasonable in some situations. For example, in a political-economic context
when x is a vector of the characteristics of a candidate for oﬃce. In this
case, some authors have formalized the preferences of a voter as the negative
of the Euclidean distance from the candidate￿s characteristics vector to the
bliss point of the voter. This approach is used, for example, in the papers
of Tullock (1967) and Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1988). Another example of a
situation where this assumption is relevant comes from spatial competition
models in the theory of industrial organization. In these models, ￿rms sell
identical goods at diﬀerent locations. A consumer￿s utility is the negative of
the price paid for the good minus the Euclidean distance between her location
and the location of a ￿rm. Popular models of this kind are the model of a
linear city developed by Hotelling (1929), and the model of a circular city
developed by Salop (1979).
14Returning to the ￿bus paradox￿ described in Introduction, note that it
can be put in a continuous choice context introducing two variables: ￿bus-
ness￿ (it measures similarity of a vehicle to a bus. For example, for a car
it is ), for a mini-van 1/2, and for a bus 1), and color (the wavelength of
light). Then the problem of choosing between driving and taking a bus can
be imbedded into a problem of choosing a vehicle out of a continuous two-
parametric family. For the steady state choice density to satisfy IIA, mistakes
in the direction of color should have the same distribution as in the direction
of ￿busness,￿ which is implausible.
4 APPLICATION OF THE THEORY TO EX-
PERIMENTAL DATA.
In this section I use the data obtained in the Merlo and Schotter (1999)
experiments to test the model developed in this chapter. Merlo and Schotter
perform experiments of a tournament variety. These experiments are simi-
lar to those of Bull, Schotter and Weigelt (1987) and Schotter and Weigelt
(1992). In these experiments, randomly paired subjects must in each round
choose a natural number e between 0 and 100. After the numbers are chosen,
15two random numbers are generated independently from a uniform distribu-
tion on the segment [−a,a].T h e ￿rst of these random numbers is added
to the number chosen by the ￿rst player, while the second one is added to
the number chosen by the second player. The player with the higher sum
wins a prize M and the other player wins a prize m. The monetary payoﬀ is
determined by the prize minus the ￿cost￿ associated with the number chosen
by the individual, given by e2/2k. Merlo and Schotter used the following
values for parameters: k =5 0 0 , a =4 0 , M =2 9 ,a n dm = 17.2.I n t h i s
case, assuming risk neutrality, the game has a unique symmetric Nash equi-
librium e =3 7 . The authors programmed a computer to play its part of the
Nash equilibrium. The subjects knew that they are facing a computer that
was programmed to play e =3 7 . Hence, the problem was basically one of
individual decision making.
Merlo and Schotter (1999) distinguished between two environments: Learn-
While-You-Earn (LWYE) and Learn-Before-You-Earn (LBYE). The game
lasted for a known number of periods T. In the actual experiments T =7 5 .
In the LWYE environment players got at the end of the game the sum (possi-
bly discounted) of their payoﬀs earned in each round. In LBYE experiments
they did not get real payoﬀs for round 1−74 but observed what they would
16have gotten if the game had been real. In round 75 they got their payoﬀ.
Stakes in this round were 75 times higher than in the games of the LWYE
environment.
The authors concluded that in the LBYE environment the choices of the
agents in the last round were closer to the optimal value 37. They explain this
by noting that these subjects experimented more aggressively during previous
periods since they did not incur any cost by experimentation. Though this
conclusion seems reasonable, one might also question whether 37 is really the
optimal choice, that is, whether risk neutrality is a reasonable assumption.
Nevertheless, the conclusion that more learning has occurred in the LBYE
environment than in the LWYE environment can be given a precise meaning
in the terms of the model of this chapter. This version of the general model
seems appropriate here since the subjects did not observe the choices of
other subjects, hence there was no scope for social adaptation. Under the
assumptions on the parameters of the model, the probability to win if the














17where u is the subject￿s Bernoulli utility function. Assume that Γ(e,t)=σ2,





































One can observe that for typical choices the term e2/1000 is much less
then 17.2, hence one can approximate the utility function by its ￿rst order
Taylor expansion. This would imply that the steady state distribution is
approximately normal (the term (u0(29)− u0(17.2))∗e3/160,000 is small for
the typical values of e observed in the experiment assuming the agents are
not too risk averse and can be neglected).
I tested the normality assumption for both environments. The extreme
observations e =0and e = 100 were excluded from the sample on the
grounds that the subjects who made these choices seemed to be ruled by
principles diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h o s eo ft h ee n t i r ep o p u l a t i o n .T h ec h o i c ee =0can
be justi￿ed by an extreme risk aversion, and the choice e = 100 by a desire
to win at any cost. I could not reject the normality hypothesis in the case of
18LBYE experiment at the 10% signi￿cance level. For the LWYE experiment
normality, can be rejected at the 47% signi￿cance level.
Using the histogram of round 75 as a proxy for the function f(e),It r i e d















Thenumbersbelowtheregressioncoeﬃcients are the corresponding t-statistics.
The quadratic function ￿ts logf(e) extremely well for the LBYE environ-
ment: R
2
=0 .997772. For the LWYE environment, the goodness of ￿ti s
much worse: R
2
=0 .705113. Hence, I conclude that in the LBYE environ-
ment the players reached the steady state in 75 rounds, while in the LWYE
environment they did not. Since in the LBYE environment agents seem to
reach steady state, the results of this regression can be used to test the risk
neutrality hypothesis. To do this I estimate the value of M − m from the
data, assuming risk neutrality, and then compare it with its actual value.
19The estimated value is 3.6 with 10% precision. This number is very far at
odds with the actual number 11.8, hence the risk neutrality hypothesis can
be ￿rmly rejected.
Now let us examine the claim of Merlo and Schotter (1999) that more
aggressive sampling produces faster learning. In my model more aggressive
sampling means higher σ. I will argue that the higher is σ,t h ef a s t e ri s


















0(e)=0for e =0 ,100. (21)














For a general discussion of the method I use below see, for example, Hilbert
and Courant (1953, Chapter VII). One can also ￿nd there a proof of all
assertions made from this point to the end of this chapter.
20De￿ne φn and λn to be the eigenfunctions and the eigenvalues of diﬀeren-
tial operator L de￿ned on a set of twice continuously diﬀerentiable functions















The constants cn are determined from the initial condition.






































Multiplying the equation Lφn = λnφn by exp(−2Π(e)/σ2),i n t e g r a t i n gf r o m0
to 100,a n dr e m e m b e r i n gt h a tφn is assumed to satisfy the boundary condition


















One can see that all the eigenvalues are nonnegative, and this implies that the
steady state distribution is stable. Now place the eigenvalues in ascending
order. Formula (26) implies that the relaxation time, that is the time in





The eigenvalue λ1 can be found as:





















φde =0 . (29)
The ￿rst order condition for problem (31)-(32) can be shown to be equivalent
to the equation determining φ1. Using this method one can ￿nd an estimate
of λ1 in the case of small payoﬀ gradients. This approximation seems to be
22satis￿ed in the Merlo and Schotter (1999) experiments. To formalize it write





Equation (33) implies that λ1 is increasing in σ2 and, hence, that learning
time is decreasing in σ2.S i n c e σ2 represents the scope of experimentation,
this is in accordance with Merlo and Schotter￿s (1999) interpretation of their
results. Formula (33) allows us to estimate σ2 to be 27.I ti sw o r t hm e n t i o n i n g
that the value of σ2 depends on the choice of time units. In this case a unit
of time is a period of the game.
One can learn two lessons from this section. First, the model of this
section provides a useful way to look at experimental data. Second, one can
use the data to estimate the parameters of the model (σ in this case).
5C O N C L U S I O N S
In this paper I developed a model of individual adjustment subject to
mistakes. If mistake process is stationary the adjustment process converges
to the unique steady state distribution. I investigated the conditions under
23which this distribution satis￿es IIA property.
It is interesting to generalize this model to a strategic environment. A ￿rst
step in this direction is undertaken by Anderson, Goeree, and Holt (1998) in
their analysis of all-pay auctions. Another potentially interesting application
of the model is to Spencian signalling game. Some preliminary results of the
author indicate that a Pareto optimal solution can be achieved in the long-
run in the case of vanishingly small noise, even if it is not a Nash equilibrium
of the signalling game.
Another line of research investigates the connections of this model with a
general model of adaptive behavior. For the development of these ideas see
Basov (2001).
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